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IN THE SUPRSME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
CITY OF SALT LAKE CITY, a 
municipal corporation; 
EMIGRATION PROPEP.TIES 
PARTNERSHIP' a Utah limi tea 
partnership; BOWERS-
SORENSON COPSTRUCTION 
COMPANY, a TJtah corooration, 
and FRED A. SMOLKA, 
Defendants-Appellants, 
vs. 
PETER DOENGSS, MILES 
CROCKARD, WILLIAM BOWEN, 
RICHARD H. WATSON, CARL 
PETERSON, and EMIGRATION 
IMPROVEMF.NT DISTRICT, 
Plaintiffs-Respondents. 
BRIEF OF 
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT 
Case No. 16649 
STATEMENT OF THE NATUPE OF THE CASE 
Respondents brought an qction in the District Court 
seeking to have the Utah statute authorizing annexation 
declared unconstitutional. 
DISPOSITION BY THE LOWER COURT 
The lower court qranted respondents' motion for summary 
judqment and held that Section 10-2-401 Utah Code Annotated 
1953, as enacted by the Laws of Utah 1977, is 
unconstitutional. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks a reversal of the lower court's order 
and a determination by this Court that the statute 
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authorizinq annexation of certain property located within 
Emigration Canyon, to Salt LakP City, is constitutional. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Between September 1977 and August 1978, three 
annexation petitions, subject of this appeal, were filed 
with the Board of Salt Lake City Commissioners. These 
petitions, when consolidated for consideration by the Ci~ 
Commission, described a contiquous parcel of unincorporatej 
territory abutting the eastern boundary of Salt Lake City ir 
an area known as Emigration Canyon. The purpose of the 
petitions appeared to be to uparade current service le~ls 
in the canyon and to expand petential for resinential 
development within the area. (Mayor's Deposition, p. 23-
24). 
Each annexation petition was, upon receipt, referrea t' 
the Salt Lake City Plannina and Zoninq Commission for 
investigation and recommendation. Final recommendation was 
made by the Planning Commission on Auqust 10, 1978, 
following approximately 8 months of study, including public 
hearings, on the proposal. '!'he Planninq Commission found 
that: (a) the prooosed annexation met necessary petition 
requirements: (b) the only way the area could receive 
adequate services was frol'l Salt r,ake Citv: ann (c) the bas; 
purpose of a city is to provide "proper services to 
developina areas." 11.ccorc'l ing ly, the Plannina Commission 
-2-
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recommended in favor of annexation ann oroposed that a 
public hearinq he held by the City Com~ission to consider 
the matter. (Jorqensen Deposition, Exhibit "l"). 
The City Commission in turn conducted its own 
investiqation of the annexation oroposal and held numerous 
public hearings thereon. During deliberations, it 
considered reports and documents from City departments, 
public aqencies and private individuals on zonina, sewer, 
water, flood control, health, traffic and terrain conditions 
and the City's ability to service the area in these 
respects. It also e\raluated police, fire, refuse coll<=!ction 
and other such services. In addition, all residents, 
property owners and interested citizens wishinq to be heard 
were qiven an opportunity to express their opinions and 
present facts, which were fully considered by the 
Commission. (Mayor's Deposition, p. 26-33). 
On April 10, 1979, followinq consideration of the 
foregoing factors, the City Commission voted unanimously, in 
public hearing, to approve the petitions for annexation. 
(Mayor's Deposition, Exhibit "l"). The following day, 
respondents obtained a preliminary iniunction from the 
District Court restraining the City from approving by 
ordinance the annexation. That injunction remains in 
current effect. 
-3-
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,\RGUMICNT 
SECTION 10-2-401, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 
1953, AS El'lACTED BY THE LAWS OF UTAH 
1977, DOES NOT VIOLATE T8E EOUAL 
PROTECTION PROVISIONS OF THE UNITED 
STATES OR UTAH CONSTITUTIONS. 
A. THE COURT SHOULD GIVE THE LEGISLATIVE ACT 
THE PRESUMPTION OF VALIDITY ABSENT A 
SHOWING THAT RESPONDENTS ARE DEPRIVED OF 
A "VOTING RIGHT" UNDER THE UTA!-! 
ANNEXATION STATUTP.. 
Four distinct types of annexation procedures are 
utilized in this country, namely: ( 1) special act of the 
state legislature; (2) <'leleqation of annexino power direct! 
to cities; (3) acts of appointe<'I commissions; and (4) 
popular determination. The selection of which method to be 
used for the extension of municipal boundaries within a 
state is "purely a political matter, entirely within the 
power of the state leqislature to requlate. It is, in othe: 
words, a legislative function." McOuillin, Municipal 
Corporations, (Vol. 2) ~7.10, p. 297. 
The annexaton method selected by the Utah leqislatITTe 
is the delegation of the annexinq power directly to 
municipal governing bodies; however, in Utah, annexation G 
initiatea by petition of a majority of the oropertv owners, 
within the area proposed to be annexe<'I. At all times 
relevant herein, Section 10-7-401, Utah Code Annotated, 
1953, provided in this reqard as follows: 
"Whenever a maioritv of the owners of real 
property and the owners of at least one third 
-4-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
in value of the real nropertv, as shown bv 
the ~ast assessment rolls, in territory lving 
contiguous to the corporate boundaries of anv 
municipalitv, shall desire to annex such 
territory to such municipality, they shall 
cause an accurate plat or map of such 
territory to be made under the supervision of 
the municipal enqineer or a competent 
surveyor, and a copy of such plat or man, 
certified by the enaineer or surveyor as the 
case may be, shall be filed in the office of 
the recorder of the municipality, tooether 
with a written petition signed by a majority 
of the real property owners and hy the owners 
of not less than one third in value of the 
real property, as shown by the last 
assessment rolls, of the territory described 
in the plat or map; ••• " (Emohasis added). 
Upon receipt of such a petition the municipality is 
empowered to review such annexation in light of its 
resources and the equities of the matter and determine the 
advisability of the boundary proposal. Section 10-2-401, 
described this process as follows: 
" • the governing body of the 
municipality, at a reqular meetino shall vote 
on the question of such annexation. The 
members of the qoverning body m~y by 
resolution passed by a two-thirds vote, 
accept the petitio~ for annexation, subject 
to the terms and conditions as they deem 
reasonable, and the territory shall then and 
there be annexed and within the boundaries of 
the municipality .••• " 
This particular orovision was amenr.ed by the 197!? 
Legislature to make minor chanqes not pertinent here. With 
the exception of the inclusion of the requirement pertaininq 
to one-third of the value of the real prooertv in 1957, the 
foreqoinq statute has provided for the initiation of 
_c:;_ 
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annexation Proceedings, hy a written petition of a na~oritv 
of the real propertv owners, since 189R. 
In adopting a statutory procedure, the state 
leoislature is presumed to have acted within its 
constitutional powers. The Utah Supreme Court has aridress~1 
this issue as follo~s: 
"It is well settled in this state, as 
elsewhere, that the courts will not declare a 
statute unconstitutional unless it clearly 
and manifestly violates some provision of the 
constitution of the United States. F.verv 
presumption must be indulged in favor of the 
constitutionality of an act, and every 
reasonable doubt resolved in favor of its 
validity. (citations omitted) The whole 
burden lies on hi~ who denies the 
constitutionality of a leqislative 
enactment. State v. Packer, 297 ~- 1013, 
1016 (Utah, 1911). See also State v. 
Packard, 250 P.2d 561 (Utah, 1952) (Emohasis 
added). 
In the recent case of Freeman v. Centerville City, 
(filed September 21, .1979), this Court upheld the 
constitutionality of the verv annexation statute here in 
question~ in doing so, the Court expressed its extreme 
reluctance to interfere with the legislative prerogatives 
contained in our statutory annexation process. The Court, 
citing numerous supporting cases, summarized as follows: 
"The power to change or modify municipal 
boundaries is a legislative f1Jnction, and as 
long as the statutory process is complied 
with, the courts will not aenerally interfere 
with the legislative prernqative, even thouqh 
a person's property by becoming subiect to 
different ;urisniction mav be suhiect to 
different rules, obliqations, or 
-h-
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assessments." 
This willingness of the Utah Suoreme Court to extend 
broan discretion to legislative hodies in establishinq 
municipal boundaries is fully consistent with lonqstanoing 
precedent recognized nationally as early as 1907 in the 
leading case of Hunter v. Pittsburq, 207 U.S. 161, 52 L.Ed. 
151, 28 s.ct. 40. That policy was reaffirmed in the 
recently reported case of Holt Civil Cluh v. Tuscalousa, -
U.S. -, - S.Ct. -, 58 L.Ed.2d 292 (1978) wherein the Supreme 
Court stated: 
"Government, observed Mr. Justice Johnson, 
'is the science of experiment [citation 
omitted) and a state is afforded wide leeway 
when experimenting with the appropriate 
allocation of state leaislative pawer. This 
Court has often recognized that Political 
subdivisions such as cities and counties are 
created by the State 'as convenient aqencies 
for exercisinq such of the governmental 
powers of the State as may he intrusted to 
them.' [citations omitted) In Hunter v. 
City of Pittsburg, supra, the court discusse~ 
at lenqth the relationship between a State 
ann its political subdivisions, renarkina: 
'The number, nature and duration of the 
powers conferred upon [municipal] 
corporations and the territory over which 
they shall be exercised rests in the absolute 
discretion of the state.' Ibid. While the 
broad statements as to state control over 
municipal corporations contained in Hunter v. 
City of Pittsburg, supra, have undoubtedly 
been aualified by the holdings of later cases 
such as Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 
supra, we think that the case continues to 
have substantial constitutional significance 
in emphasizing the extraordinarily.wide . 
latitude that states have in creating various 
types of political subdivisions and 
conferring authoritv upon them." 
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The case of I~ramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.s, 
621, 23 L.Ed.2d 583, 89 s.ct. 1886 (1969) cited by the Coun 
above, is one of several cases which have carved a narrow 
exception to the "extraordinarily wide latitude" th s e upre~,, 
Court has granted state leqislaLures in equal protection 
matters. It is precisely upon this case which the Third 
District Court placed heavy ieliance in its invalidation~ 
the Utah annexation statute. 
At issue in Kramer was a New York voter qualification 
statute that limited the vote in school district elections 
largely to property owners within the district. Without 
deciding whether or not a State may in some circumstances 
limit the franchise to residents primarily affected by the 
activities of a given aovernmental unit, the court held that 
the statute was not sufficiently tailored to meet that state 
interest since its classifications excluded some residents 
of the district who had direct interests in school boarn 
decisions and included many others whose interests were 
remote. 
The upshot of Kramer and related cases, is that the 
traditional presumption of constitutional vali~ity of a 
statute remains and if the court can conceiv~ of anv 
rational connecton between the classification and a pro~r 
state objective, the act will bE> held valid. However, if 
the law creates a "suspect classification," such as ra~. M 
-8-
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affects a "fundamental right" such as the riqht to vote, and 
the state action affects plaintiffs differently erom other 
people who are similarly situated, the burden will fall on 
the state to prove that the classification is necessary to 
promote a "compelling interest." See Holt, ~· p. 299; 
Reynolds v. Simms, 377 U.S. 533, at 562, 84 S.Ct. 1362, 12 
L.Ed.2d 506 (1964). 
A "fundamental riqht" is alleged to have been violated 
in this action, namely, the riqht to vote. As will be shown 
in Section B hereof, participation in Utah's annexation 
petition process is not a fundamental, voting riqht. Ree 
Berrv v. Bourne, 588 F.2d 422 (4th Cir., 1978). Therefore,· 
the Utah annexation statute is presumed constitutional and 
the Court should reverse the decision of the lower court and 
rule, as a matter of law, that the statute is valid. 
B. THE LOWER COURT ERRED WHEN IT CONCLUDED 
THAT TO PETITION FOR ANNEXATION UNDER 
UTAH STATUTES CONSTIT[JTES A VOTING 
RIGHT. FURTHER, NO BASIS FOR AN EQUAL 
PROTECTION CLAIM EXISTS IN THE ABSENCE OF 
SUCH A RIGHT. 
The Third District Court in the instant action did not 
rule as to whether the statutory annexation process had been 
complied with. Instead, it concluded that Section 10-2-401, 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, is void on its face in that it 
contravenes the equal protection provisions of both state 
and federal constitutions by denyinq the right of "persons 
other than taxpayers" a voice in the annexation process. 
-9-
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The lower court based its decision on the Kramer case, 
supra, ann upon several other cases construinq equal 
protection provisions as they aoplv to the exercise of t~ 
elective franchise. Also cit~d was a student authored l~ 
review article proposing that the principles aoplied in 
these voter franchise cases should be extended to precl~e 
the annexation oetition process e1T1oloyed within our state. 
Conspicuously absent was any case ruling on the point at 
issue - the constitutionality of a non-elective petition 
process leadinq to a legislative determination. 
Interestingly, in its necision voiainq the statute 
which establishes the sole mechanism for annexation within 
our state, the district court acknowledqed the existance~ 
the very recent case of 'l'orres v. Villaqe of Capitan, 582 
P.2d 1277 (New Mexico, 1978). However, the Court failed t0 
follow that decision and it is the only case noted by the 
lower court which was in point. In fact, the holdinq of 
that case is on all fours with the issues in the instant 
action. 
In the Torres case, the Supreme Court of New Mexico 
upheld ons annexation statute similar to the TJtah statute. 
This law permitted cities to approve annexation of 
contiquous territory upon receipt of petitions signed by 
"owners of a majority of the number of acres in the 
contiguous territory." Like the case before the Bar, the 
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parties in that case sought to void the New Mexico 
annexation statute by attemptinq to equate the siqninq of an 
annexation petition with the "riqht to vot-.• " ~ In rloina so, 
they attempted to avail themselves of the sane case law 
regardinq elective processes now reliea upon by plaintiffs 
in the instant action. 
The New Mexico Court, however, rejected that 
equation. It correctly held: 
"that petitioning for annexation of lana in 
this case is not a fundamental voting right 
an<l that §14-7-17, [the annexation statute in 
question) supra, is constitutional." Id. at 
p. 1283 --
Plaintiffs' argument before the District Court in the 
case at hand parrots precisely the reasoning heard and 
rejected by the New Mexico high court. (See Exhibit "A,• 
Brief of Salt Lake County as amicus curiae, corrected Auqust 
14, 1979). Not one single case has been presented by 
plaintiff-respondents which holds for the position they urqe 
this court to novelly adopt; namely, that petition process 
leading to ?. leqislative determination on annexation is 
unconstitutional. 
Rather, each case relied upon dealt with either an 
election or a petition process which lead to an election. 
As such, the cases presented by plaintiffs and relied upon 
by the District Court are clearly not in ooint. 
Numerous additional attempts have recently been made to 
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strike down, on equal protection grounds, oetition process' 
leading to review of annexation proposals by municipal 
bodies. As in Torres, each such challenqe has faileC!, n,, 
most recent case, in which such an attack h2s been 
considerea is Berry v. Bourne, 588 P. /.n 422 ( 1978). In th! 
case, the United States Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals 
ruled valid the statutP., which authorized municipal 
annexaton within the State of South Carolina under a sirnil' 
petitioning process as employed in the Utah statute. 
The South Carolina statute authorizP.d the qoverninq 
body of a city, upon filing of a petition siqned by seventv 
five percent or more of the freeholders in any area 
contiguous to the city requesting annexation, to annex surl 
area by the adoption of an appropriate resolution. The 
plaintiff in that action, one of thirteen registerec'I voter' 
living in an area oroposed to be annexed, sought an 
injunction against the City of North Charleston. He 
asserted that the statute, by denying to the reqistered 
voters the right to vote on the annexation, violated ~e 
rights of such voters under the equal protection clause. 
The Fourth Circuit affirmed the District Court's denia 
of the injunction and upheld the South Carolina annexation 
statute. In doinq so, that Court relien upon the broad 
lanquaqe of the Suorerne Court in Hunter, suora, and upootl 
cases which followed it. These cases unequivicallv declar' 
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that annexation by a city is purely a state political or 
legislative matter, entirely within the power of the state 
legislature to regulate. 
It was urged, however, by plaintiffs attackina the 
statute, that Hunter, supra, and the many cases decided 
unaer it, must be considered to have been overruled by the 
later decisions in Cipriano v. City of Houma, (1969) 395 
U.S. 701, 89 s.ct. 1897, 23 L.Ed.2d 647 and ~ramer, supra. 
However, such an assertion was without merit because, these 
cases merely established the princiole that otherwise 
qualified electors may not be excluded from voting in an 
election on the basis that they did not own uroperty within 
the area. They do not consider and do not relate to the 
process of by which a legislative body considers exercisinq 
its legislative function of approving an annexation. 
Therefore, they have no precidential value in the matter at 
issue. 
The Fourth Circuit Court correctly analysed these 
authorities and noted that there is no basis for an equal 
protection claim where no one is qiven the riqht to vote on 
the matter of annexation. 'J'he court emphasized that under 
the petition process before it, no such votinq riaht existed 
because final determination of the matter was reserved to 
the municipal authority. The Court surnrnarized this point as 
follows: 
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"We emphasize aqain that neither freeholders 
nor electors as such are aiven the riqht to 
vote on annE>xation unrler the statntE> jn 
question; that riaht is qiven exclusively to 
the aoverninq boara of the annexinq city. It 
is true that three-fourths of the freeholders 
in the area to be annexed must request 
annexation before the qoverning body of the 
annexing city may consider annexation. ~his 
is a common preliminary Prerequisite for 
authorization of an annexatio~, whether by 
election or by action of the annexing city's 
governing board. But the important fact is 
that the action of the freeholders in siqning 
the request for annexation does not authorize 
annexation. Annexation depends wholly upon 
the favorable vote of the governing hody of 
the annexing city. This is the crucial 
action and on that neither freeholders nor 
electors as such have a vote. Since the 
electors of the municipalitv of the area to 
be annexed are not given the riaht to vote 
under the challenaed statute, the aoplication 
of the statute ooses no eaual protection 
issue. (Emphasis adned). 
The court further aistinauished each of the cases cit' 
by plaintiffs as dealing solelv with the elective franchi~' 
and inapplicable to a petition process lea~ing to a 
legislative consideration: 
"We find nothing in the several decisions 
dealing with restrictions on the riaht to 
vote (~haracterized by the plaintiff as cases 
touching on the burden of the right to vote) 
applicable in the context of the issue before 
us. In all those cases cited by the 
plaintiff, there was to be an election ana 
the constitutional attack was directed by 
restraints upon the riaht to vote in that 
election. The proceaure challenged by the 
plaintiff in this case, however, involv~s no 
election; in fact, it is a procedure which 
does not contemplate an election. 
Consequently, we are not cnncerned with anv 
unconstitutional limitation upon the r1aht to 
vote in an election." At p. 425. (Emphasis 
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added). 
The New Mexico Suoreme Court and Fourth Circuit Court 
of Apneals were clear in their re:iection of arquments which 
would invalidate annexation on equal protection grounds, 
when such procedures involve leqislative rather than 
election processes. Further, there does not appear to be a 
"voting right" present where the annexation decision is 
judicially, rather than legislatively determined. See 
Citizens Committee to Oppose Annexation v. City of 
Lynchburq, Virginia, 400 F.Supp. 68 (1976) affirmed in 
relevant respects 528 F.2o 816 (1976) application for 
injunction denied 96 S.Ct. 766, 423 U.S. 1043, 46 L.Ed.2d 
632 (1976). Plaintiffs contend, without authority of law, 
that there is no constitutional difference between voting 
ann petitioning. It seems obvious, however, to this writer 
and to apparently all courts which have ruled upon this 
particular annexation question, that althouah the elective 
process is "popular" the annexation process here under 
consideration is "legislative" in nature. That is, the 
decision as to whether to annex does not lie with the public 
at the ballot box, but with the elected representatives on 
the City Commission. 
The Utah annexation process does not in any respect 
constitute an "election" has been made conclusively clear in 
Utah. Less than t~o months ago, in the Freeman case, supra, 
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held aqainst a constitutional attack on our annexation 
statute focused on due process orounds. It was contend~ 
the plain ti ff in that action that the annexaton statute h 
constitutionally defective because it failed to provide~ 
those in the area to be annexed must receive notice of the 
annexation proceedings ann the riqht to elect whether or n· 
to have their property anneied. It was arqued by the 
plaintiff that (hecause his property would be subiect ~l 
assessments, liens, and encumbrances imposed by the city 
through annexation), he was deprived of property without d! 
process of law by the annexation. 
In that action, this Court reaffirmed its reluctan~t 
interfere in a fundamentally legislative process and statei 
as follows concerning the assertion that the petition 
process constituted an election: 
"In enacting §10-2-401 the Legislature 
established a means for annexation which 
calls for the consent of both the annexing 
municipality and a maiority of the prooerty 
owners in the area seekina annexaton. The 
initiation of the annexation process bv~­
petition is not the equivalent of an 
election, nor need it be. It is onlv the 
triqaerinq process for the concerned 
municioalitv to consummate the annexation 
procedure b~ exercising its legislative oower 
if it deems it appropriate to do so. 
(Emphasis added). Freeman v. Centerville 
City, 
In holding that a petition process leadina to a 
leqislative determination does not constitute an election, 
. Pat teric! this Court reaffirmed its longstandinq holdinq in~
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v. Carbon Water Conservancv Dist., 145 P.2a 503 (Utah, 
1944). In that case, this Court ruled aqainst an equal 
protection challenge to a statutory procedure, which 
precluded owners of property whose assessed valuation was 
less than $300 from petitionino for creation of a proposed 
conservancy district. The Court summarized its decision 
upholding the statute as follows: 
"The legislature had the oower to create a 
water conserva.ncv district bv its own fiat. 
It need not have given anv individual or 
qroup the riqht to petition for the creation 
of a district. It was within its discretion 
to determine what qualification, if anv, a 
petitioner for the creation of a district 
must have, since the petition for the 
forMation or the formation of the district 
itself do not affect any property riohts. 
Had the legislature created the district it 
could have provided for a tax on all property 
within the district to pay for the costs and 
maintenance of the project. See In re 
Proposed Middle Rio Grande Co~servancy 
District, 31 N.M. 188, 242 P. 683, at Paqe 
689, in which the court in determining that a 
provision in its water conservancy act that 
only resident freeholders could sign the 
petition for the formation of the district 
was not unconstitutional quotes with approval 
the followinq statement of the Californa 
Supreme Court deciding a similar question in 
the case of In re Bonds of the Madera 
Irrigation District, 92 Cal. 296, 7.8 P. 272, 
675, 14 L.R.A. 755, 27 Arn. St.Rep. 106: 'It 
is objected to this, that it is placing in 
the hands of those not interested the pawer 
of imposing a burden upon t~e owners of the 
land, who may be a small minority of the 
electors within that district, or who may 
even be nonresidents of the rlistrict. This, 
however, is a matter which was addressed 
purelv to the discretion of the 
Leq i slature. Whether such a petition sh<?uld 
he ma~e bv the owners oF a fixed proportion 
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of the land, as was required in thP 
reclamation l~w, or whether there shoul~ he 
any qualification to the petitioners, or 
whether there shoula he anv limit to the 
expenses which they were authorized to incur 
for the purposes of the improvement, are 
questions which were solely for the 
consideration of the Leqislature. * * * It 
must be observed, however, that this petition 
has no bindinq operation, but is merely the 
initiatory step which qives to the board of 
supervisors a iurisdiction to act uoon the 
expediency or oolicy of authorizinq. the 
creation of the district.'" (Emphasis added) 
ra. at p. 512. 
It is clear from the above that, under an electi"e 
process, the eligible citizenry is aiven authority to mab 
final determination on a political issue. Bxclusion frm 
the process excludes a party from meaningful participatioo 
altogether. However, as stated by this Court, our 
annexation process differs fundamentally from an elective 
process. This is true because citizens do not effectuate 
the annexation; rather, they merely, by petition, permit 
the matter to be considered by the elected officials ~a~~ 
with responsibility for delivery of the municipal 
services. 
In other words, annexation decisions in Utah are made 
by elected representatives of the ~ublic, they are not Jllarle 
directly by the public itself. This representative 
principle and process is fully comoatible with fundamental 
constitutional principles. 
Under Utah and most other state annexation procenurP, 
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anv interested person may appear personally or by petition 
before the elected officials of the city and have their 
views heard and considerea. In fact, the voluminous record 
before the Court in this appeal demonstrates the areat 
extent to which the views and expressions of all interested 
persons were solicited and consiaered by the City and its 
elected officials. In the words of Mayor Wilson: 
"I took pride in the fact I read almost every 
document word by wora. I don't say I read 
everythinq, but I made an attempt to and took 
all of that into account when I made my own 
decision." (Mayor Wilson Deoosition at 33). 
Thus, the petition by a majority of oroperty owners in 
the area proposed for annexation was not the means by which 
the decision to annex was made. ~he petition did Provide 
the statutory means by which the City Commission assured 
itself that a need and desire for municipal services existed 
in the subiect area prior to aporovina annexation. 
The United State Supreme Court has recently ioinea 
other courts (cited herein) in haltinq attempts to unduly 
extend this "one man, one vote" doctrine articulated in 
Kramer beyond its intended scope. In Holt, supra, the 
Supreme Court considered the equal protection claim of 
certain residents of a small unincorporated community near 
the corporate limits of Tuscalousa, Alabama. The issues of 
th0t case focused on a statute which aave extraterritorial 
cff~ct to municioal police and sanitary ordinances. It was 
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contended that the statute violated the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, by extending such ~1 
over persons residing outsiae municipal boundaries, wit~ 
permitting such residents to vote in rnnnicipal elections. 
The Court therein rejected the contention that under ~~ 
-
and cases wich followed in its wake, the state's denial~ 
the franchise to police iurisdiction residents could star· 
only if justified bv "a compellina state interest." ~~ 
contrary, the court concluded: 
"some rational relations'. 
to a legitimate state purpose" is all that is required. : 
at p. 29q and p. 302. 
The Court further s11mmarized its twlainas in all of. 
voter-qualification cases, includinq Kramer. It articula: 
the common ct:aracteristic existant in all such cases anc 
stated: 
"From these and our other votina 
qualifications cases a com~on characteristic 
emerqes: the challenqed statute in each case 
denied the franchise to individuals who were 
physically resident within the aeoaraphic 
boundaries of the governmental entity 
concernea. 
* * * 
"No necision of this Court has extenaen the 
•one nan, one vote' nrinciole to individuals 
residinq bevond the qeoaraohic confines of 
the qovern~ental entitv concerned, be it the 
state or its political subdivision. On the 
contrarv, our cases have unifor~ly recoanized 
that a qovernrnental unit may leaitimately 
restrict the riaht to participate in its 
political processes to those vh0 reside 
within its horders. 
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* * * 
"The line heretofore markea by this Court's 
votinq qualifications decisions coincides 
with the geographical boundary of the 
governmental unit at issue, and we hold that 
appellant's case, like their homes, falls on 
the farther side." Id. at op. 300-302. 
(Emphasis added). 
Thus, in the case at hand, respondents' efforts to 
extend "voting riahts" beyond the territorial limits of the 
municipality are without authoritv of law. Purther, the 
case law is uniform in holdina that a petition process, 
leading to leaislative consideration of an annexation 
proposal is not in any resoect an election: thus, such a 
petitionina process is in everv sense constitutional. 
C. SECTION 10-2-401, WHICH PF.RMITS THB 
INITIATION OF ANNEXJ\_TION PROCEEDINGS BY 
PETITION OF PROPERTY OWNERS, BEARS A 
RATIONAL RRLATIONSHIP "'0 A LEGITIMN'.'E 
STATE PURPOSE AND NO BASIS OF AN EQUAL 
PROTECTION CL.II.Ir-'! EXISTS IN T<-tE FAC.F OF 
SUCH A PELATIONSHIP. 
Stripped of its votina rights attire, the equal 
protection issue oresented by respondents be~omes whether 
the ntah annexation statute bears so!'le rational relationship 
to a legitimate state purpose. Ahsent a showing of a voting 
riaht, the Supreme Court in Holt, supra, reasoned that the 
"Equal Protection Clause is offended only if the statute's 
classification rests upon qrounds whollv irrelevant to the 
achi<>vernent of the state's obiective." At oaae 302. 
r11rther, a court's inauirv is limiteo to the question of 
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whether "any state of facts reasonahlv mav he 
. cone" i verJ t 
iustify" the challenqed statute. 
In the case of .l\da:ns v. City of Colorado Sor inos, l~f 
F.Supp. 1397 (D. Colo., 1970) the court denied an equal 
protection challenge to a Colorado annexation statute, th, 
statute required an election for annexation where the 
perimeter of the territory was less than two-thirds 
contiguous with the municipality, and permitted a petit~ 
but no election, in areas of more than two-thirds 
contiguity. The plaintiffs in that action conceded that• 
legislature was emoowerea to create annexation Jllachinerv, 
without aranting the riqht to vote; however, they maintair. 
that if the legislature extenne<'l the Franchise to one qro1 
it must exten<'l the same right to another arouP absent a 
"compelling puhlic reason." In re1ectino Plaintiffs' 
constitutional claim and the strict stannard of review~ 
propose<'l, the Court reasoned in part as follows: 
"We are unable to hold that the distinction 
recognized by the Assembly as to when the 
franchise may be exercised is unreasonahle in 
light of the manifest purposes for the 
differentiation. Thus, where the area to be 
annexed has less than two-thirds contiauity 
with the annexing city, the interrelationship 
between the annexed areas and the city mav 
not be great enouqh to warrant a oolitically 
undesirable unilateral Jllerger. Where, 
however, the territory to be annexed has over 
two-thir<'ls contiauitv with the annexina city, 
the interrelationshi~ between the two areas 
is or can be so close that the city should be 
allowed to annex despite the unwillinoness of 
the residents of the annexed territory. The 
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law thus recoqnizes ~hat a municipality such 
as Color~~o Sprinas is severelv handic~noed 
by an anneyation law which rPquires the 
approval of the prooerty owners an~ aualifie~ 
electors of an annexea area. It is unable to 
deal with qroups of citizens who form small 
tax colonies on the bor0er of the core city 
which is the economic base of the urban area 
and to which the colonies owe their verv 
existence and yet pay nothinq for the 
advantaqe which the city orovides. These 
people would seldom consent to the annexation 
and their non-consent would threaten the very 
existencR of the core city." (Emohasis 
added). 
The New Mexico Supreme Court in ~orres, supra, likewise 
applied only "minimum scrutiny" in upholdinq the 
constitutionality of that state's annexation petition 
statute. In that case the court, on its own, found rational 
basis for the initiation of annexation bv propertv owners: 
"There being no provision in our law for an 
election on this issue, we have even less 
need to apply strict scrutiny reaardina the 
issue bearing on violation of the equal 
protection clause than was true in Adams, 
supra. Only minimum scrutinv need be aoolied 
to uphold the constitutionality of our 
statutes since they do not involve elections 
and therefore do not infrinae upon the 
fundamental riaht to vote •. Under this level 
of scrutinv a statutorv discrimination of 
i~eaualitv.will not be. set aside if any state 
of facts reasonably mav be conceived to 
iustify it. [Citation omitted) The record 
need not show what the reasonable basis is 
since the appellate court mav on its own find 
a reasonable basis. [Citation omitted] One 
obvious and rational basis for the initiation 
of the annexation by owners of a majority of 
the acreaqe is that taxes to support the 
Villaqe will be partiallv apportioned in 
·accordance with the amount of land owned by 
t~~ new residents or landowners brouaht into 
thP Villae. Our statutes meet the test of 
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minimum scrutiny." (Emphasis anded). 
In determininq whether a rational basis exists furt 
initiation of annexaton hy property owners in our starQ 
-., 
sbould be borne in mino that municipalities 'ffe suhdivisr 
of the state ann their purooses are statutory in nat.ure. 
namely to deliver municioal services. The lq79 statp 
leq islature specifically stated such in Sect ion 10-2-401 
the newly adopted annexation law as follows: 
"10-2-401. The legislature hereby declares 
that it is leaislative policy that: 
"(l) Sound urban development is essential to 
the continued economic development of this 
state; 
"(2) Municipalities are created to provide 
urban aovernmental services essential ~or 
sound urban development and for the 
protection or public health, safety and 
welfare in residential, commercial and 
industrial areas, and in ~reas underaoina 
r1evelopment;" 
The leqislature further, in Suhsect-.ion (3) of that 
section, delineated the oolicv uoon which municipal 
annexations should be qoverned. 
"(3) Municipal boundaries should be 
extended, in accordance with specific 
standards, to include areas where a hiah 
quality of urban qovernmental services is . 
needed and can be provided for the orotect1on 
of public health, safety and welfare and to 
avoid the inequities of double taxation and 
the proliferation of snecial service 
districts;" 
It is apparent from the foreaoina that where ur~n 
services are needPn, cities not only mav, b~1t shoulr1, ,, 
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their boundaries in accordance with leqislative standard. 
Such is the purpose for which they were created and such is 
the purpose for which the Emiaration Canyon Annexation was 
petitioned for and approved. 
It must be borne in mind that annexation is lara.ely the 
means by which development occurs ~ithin our state. Thus, 
where annexation is contemplated, the health of state 
citizens and the economic welfare of the state rest in the 
balance. To the extent that annexation machinery is 
complicated annexation is discouraged. When annexation is 
discouraaed, either (1) develooment is retarned; (?.) limited 
function entities proliferate; or (3) double taxation 
inequities are generated. Accordinclv, a streamlined 
annexation mechanism is an essential element of state and 
municipal welfare. 
It must also be considered, as the court in Adams, 
supra, was auick to point out, that an annexaton law which 
requires the approval of propertv owners and qualified 
electors of an annexed area, severely handicaps annexation 
efforts. Residents of "tax colonies" on the fringes of the 
core city pay nothina for the advantaaes the city provides 
and accordingly seldom consent to annexation. Further, the 
mohile nat11re of our modern urhan communities make 
ascertainment of residencv an often burdensome Procedure. 
l\ccornincilv, the Utah leaislature has estal:>lishe<i a 
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trioqerinq mechanism for annexation within our st~tD_ 
" Which 
does not attempt to determine actual ownership or 
residency. It has deferred, instead, to the Countv tax 
rolls for an ascertainment of persons gualifyin<: to be 
tallied on an annexation petition count. The purpose of 
that count is not to allow croperty owners to "vote" or 
otherwise make a decision on the annexation. The petition 
merely provides the statutory means hy which the City 
Co~mission assures itself that some need and desire for 
annexation exists "lithin the sub"iect area prior to apnrovir 
annexation. 
Tax rolls were likely selected as the reference source 
because qualifications of petition sionatories could be 
easilv and finally determined therefrom. The lono history 
of this process in Utah and its retention in the 1979 
leqislative revision are testimonv of the leoislatures 
acceptance of the mechanism as an effective means to acinreE 
its policy oh~ectives. 
It is possible to speculate on the existence of ~u~I 
inexpensive and simple mechanisms for approxirnatino local 
support for annexation; however, the oolitical science 
qwC?stion of the most "practicAl" approach, is a leqislatiVt 
matter and is not before the court. As stated in~, 
supra, "Our inquiry is limited to th1> ouestion whether 'ar 
. . f '" ti" 
state of facts reasonably mav be conceived tn iust1 v 
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statute. 
Armed with a aeneral indication of support from the 
annexing area, the municipal legislati?e body procee~s to 
review the annexation in light of its resources an~ the 
equities of the matter and 0etermine the advisability of the 
boundary nroposal. Durina this review, each citizen is 
"given a voice" throuah the public hearina process. Such a 
process is efficient and fundamentally consistent with state 
policy and constitutional qovernment. No basis for an equal 
protecton claim exists in the face of such a relationship. 
CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court of Utah has very recently spoken in 
clear and decisive support of Tltah's annexation statute as 
beinq constitutional. In ctoing so, it has stated that "[w]e 
find no basis in the Constitution for ~akina the general 
annexation process subiect to conditions bevond those stated 
in the statute." See Freeman v. Centerville Citv, supra. 
In that same case, this court statea that "ftlhe initiation 
of the annexation process bv oetition is not the equivalent 
of an election," but "is only the triaaering process for the 
concernect municipality to consrnnmate the annexation 
procedure by exercisinq its leaislative power if it deems it 
appropriate to do so." This Court concluded that: 
"[t]he Le0islature was also clearly within 
its riqht to provide a mechanis~ for . 
~nnexation which does not require an election 
hv those affected." 
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Contrarv to that rulin0 an~ the anolicahle case law fr~ 
virtually every other iurisdiction, the lower court has 
taken an activist--and erroneous--oosition. It equated tn, 
annexation petition process, under Utah law, with the riqrr 
to-vote-in-elections process, unrler the egual protectioo 
clause of the federal and state constitutions. The wishfu~ 
thinking of itinerant student writers in Law Review artk~ 
should not he the basis of. upsettinq lona-estahlishec'l ancl 
soun<'f leqal princioles pertainino to annexation, so recent! 
reaffirmed by this court. 
As coaently pointed out bv the Unite~ States Fourth 
Circuit Court of Appeals in Berry v. Bourne, supra, with 
respect to the proposed elevation of the annexation oroces! 
by the Harvard Law Review to a f'l_ore lofty acanemic realri or 
the bootstraps of the equal protection clause: 
"Such an argument is supported by no 
authority and appears to us to be an extreme 
exercise in preciosity and without merit." 
It is submi tten that the decision of tre lower court: 
this case is equally as ill-anvisen by the Utah Law Review 
and should be placed in prOPPr cons ti tut ion al perspectiVP t 
a speedy reversal. 
Resnectfully suhmitted, 
ROGEP P. CTJTT.F.R 
Citv Attnrnev 
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